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filed no timely motion to withdraw his pleas and has not argued 
plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, he has waived 
this claim on direct appeal. State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 
570 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 580-82 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
2. Can defendant prevail on his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim where he does not argue that counsel's performance 
prejudiced his case, or, alternatively, where the record either 
contradicts his claims of deficient performance or contains no 
facts to overcome the strong presumption that counsel provided 
constitutionally sufficient representation? Defendants claim 
presents a question of law reviewed on the trial record because 
he presents the claim for the first time on direct appeal without 
a prior evidentiary hearing. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 
175 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and rules, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In two separate informations, the State charged defendant 
with distributing a controlled substance and with possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, both second 
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terms for both crimes -- one to fifteen years for distributing a 
counterfeit controlled substance, and not more than five years 
for attempted possession of a counterfeit controlled substance 
with intent to distribute -- and ordered the sentences to run 
concurrently (R. 47, 123, 160). Defendant timely filed his 
notices of appeal (R. 48-49) -1 
STATEMENT 0? FACTS 
The State accused defendant of selling methamphetamine to an 
undercover narcotics agent and of possessing methamphetamine 
secreted in a car defendant was driving (R. 9, 67).2 Defendant 
denied the substance was methamphetamine, explaining it was a 
composite mixture of over-the-counter drugs (R. 142-45).3 
Consistent with this explanation, defendant agreed to plead 
guilty to one count of distribution of a counterfeit controlled 
substance, based on the sale to the undercover agent, and one 
xThe notice of appeal for trial court case no. 941900597 is 
inexplicably missing from the record. However, the State's file 
contains a copy, served on it by this Court, which shows a timely 
file stamp from the Third District Court. See addendum B. 
2Police found the methamphetamine in hidden compartments in 
containers found in the car (R. 67) . 
3The field test showed the substance was methamphetamine (R. 
9, 156-57). The State did not concede that it was a counterfeit 
substance; it agreed to amending the information solely to 
facilitate the plea bargain. 
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count of attempted possession of a counterfeit controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute it, based on discovering 
the substance in the car he was driving (R. 135-39)• In 
exchange, the State agreed to allow defendant to plead to the 
lesser included attempt charge, moved to dismiss the two 
misdemeanor charges, and moved to dismiss two additional cases 
filed against defendant (R. 139-40). 
In his plea affidavits and at the plea colloquy, defendant 
admitted he had sold and had attempted to possess a counterfeit 
substance purported to be methamphetamine (R. 33, 105, 137-38) . 
During the plea colloquy, the trial court cautioned defendant 
that he had only thirty days from the date of his pleas to file a 
motion to withdraw them, and admonished him that the motion "will 
not automatically be granted unless you can show good cause" (R. 
139) . 
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARSUMENT 
1. Guilty pleas. Defendant makes several appellate 
challenges to his guilty pleas. However, defendant presented 
none of his challenges to the trial court in a timely motion to 
withdraw his pleas, even though the trial court warned him of the 
thirty-day time limit to file his motion. On appeal, defendant 
5 
has argued neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances. 
Defendant has therefore failed to provide this Court with a basis 
for reaching the merits of his claims and is relegated to 
litigating them in a petition for post-conviction relief. 
2. Ineffective assistance. Defendant also claims his 
trial counsel represented him deficiently in the plea process. 
However, defendant has not established that, but for the 
deficiencies he claims, there exists a reasonable probability 
that he would not have pleaded guilty. His failure to prove this 
necessary element independently defeats his claim. Alteratively, 
the existing record either contradicts his claims of deficient 
performance, or is insufficient to enable this Court to review 
them on direct appeal. Therefore, defendant has failed to meet 
his burden of providing record evidence to overcome the strong 




DEFENDANT'S FAILURES TO FILE A TIMELY MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS AND TO ARGUE OR ESTABLISH PLAIN 
ERROR OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ON APPEAL PRECLUDES 
CONSIDERING THE MERITS OF HIS CHALLENGES TO HIS GUILTY 
PLEAS 
The trial court accepted defendant's pleas on July 18, 1994 
6 
(R. 40, 112-13). On August 19, 1994, two days after the thirty-
day deadline expired, defendant moved to withdraw them (R. 43, 
119). Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995). At the hearing on his 
motion to withdraw, defendant claimed that he pleaded guilty in 
order to buy time to investigate the case and locate witnesses 
who would testify for him (R. 166, 168-69). He also admitted, 
however, that he understood no %lguarantee" existed that he could 
withdraw his pleas during the thirty-day period (R. 166) . The 
trial court denied defendant's motions (R. 46, 122, 125-26).4 
On appeal, defendant contends that he did not enter knowing 
and intelligent pleas because counsel led him to believe that 
pleading guilty would buy him more time to investigate the case, 
essentially repeating the argument he made to the trial court, 
and because counsel failed to inform him that he could only 
withdraw his pleas for good cause. Appellant's Brief at 10-12.5 
4The trial court denied the motions because: 1) defendant 
filed them outside the thirty-day period; 2) defendant had 
sufficient experience with the criminal justice system to 
understand what he was doing when he pleaded; and 3) defendant 
knowingly pleaded guilty and established no good cause for 
withdrawing his pleas (R. 125-26)• 
defendant fails to support these factual allegations with 
any record citations, as required by rule 24(a)(9), and the 
record contains no evidence to support them. The State addresses 
trial counsel's performance in Point II of this brief. 
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Defendant also challenges the validity of his pleas on several 
grounds he never presented to the trial court, even in his 
belated motions to withdraw his pleas: 1) that the trial court 
failed to inform him of all of the necessary elements of 
attempted possession with the intent to distribute; 2) that the 
trial court failed to ask him to state the factual basis for the 
crime in his own words; and 3) there was no sufficient factual 
basis for defendant's plea because he consistently maintained 
that he was selling something other than methamphetamine. 
Appellant's Brief at 12-16. 
Defendant cannot challenge his guilty pleas on direct appeal 
without first preserving his challenges in a motion to withdraw 
his pleas filed in the trial court. State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 
1064, 1067 (Utah 1993); State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 
(Utah 1987). Defendant must move to withdraw his guilty pleas 
within thirty days after entering them. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-
6(2) (b) (1995). Because the trial court informed defendant of 
the thirty-day limit and because defendant still filed his 
motions outside that period, the trial court lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the motions, gtate v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 582 (Utah 
8 
App. 1992) .6 
As a result of his default in the trial court, defendant 
must establish either that the trial court committed plain error 
in accepting his guilty pleas, or that exceptional circumstances 
require reaching the merits of his claims before this Court may 
consider them on the merits. State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1311; 
State v. Price. 837 P.2d at 580-81. However, defendant fails to 
argue, let alone establish, either; instead, he presents his 
challenges to his guilty pleas as though he properly presented 
them to the trial court. 
Because defendant did not present his claims to the trial 
court in a timely motion to withdraw and has not established or 
even argued plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court 
cannot consider the merits of his claims on direct appeal. State 
v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569-70 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to 
consider two challenges to Jennings' guilty plea because he did 
not present them to the trial court and did not argue plain error 
6The trial court denied defendant's motion as untimely (R. 
125-26). Nevertheless, the trial court also considered the 
merits of defendant's motion, and alternatively denied the motion 
because defendant failed to establish good cause to justify 
withdrawing his plea (id.). However, the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to reach the merits of defendant's motion, and its 
ruling on the merits has no effect, state y. Price. 837 P.2d at 
581-82. 
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or exceptional circumstances on appeal); State v. Price. 837 P.2d 
at 580-81. Defendant is therefore relegated to a petition for 
post-conviction relief to address the merits of these claims. 
£&& State Y, Johnson/ 856 P.2d at 1067 & n.2. 
Point II 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH ANY PREJUDICE CAUSED 
BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE DEFEATS HIS INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM; ALTERNATIVELY, THE RECORD 
EITHER CONTRADICTS HIS CLAIMS OR IS INADEQUATE TO 
REVIEW THEM ON DIRECT APPEAL 
In order to establish he did not receive the level of 
representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, defendant has 
the burden of establishing two elements. First, he must identify 
the specific acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687-88, 690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 
(Utah), cert, denied. 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994). This element 
requires defendant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered constitutionally sufficient assistance. Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. at 690; Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d at 522. 
Second, defendant must affirmatively prove w'a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's error, he . • . would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" 
Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) (quoting Hill v. 
10 
Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 
Defendant must establish that the claimed ineffective 
assistance is a "demonstrable reality;" he cannot rely on mere 
speculation. Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d at 526; Fernandez V» 
Cook. 870 P.2d at 877 (Utah 1993). Because there has been no 
prior evidentiary hearing, defendant must establish both elements 
on the trial record. State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d at 175. 
Defendant has not argued# let alone established, how any of 
trial counsel's acts or omissions led him to plead guilty when he 
would not have otherwise. Defendant's failure even to argue this 
critical element independently defeats his ineffectiveness claim. 
£&& State V. BJShPP, 753 P.2d 439, 489 (Utah 1988) ("»[t]his 
Court will not engage in constructing arguments out of whole 
cloth on behalf of defendants1n) (citation omitted). 
Alternatively, the trial record either contradicts his 
claims or lacks sufficient facts to enable this Court to review 
them on direct appeal. State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 
App.), certf denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); State v. Johnson. 
823 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991).7 Defendant first contends that 
7Although he does not cite to it to support his factual 
assertions, defendant has attached a copy of the affidavit he 
submitted to this Court in support of his motion for remand 
pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. That 
11 
trial counsel performed deficiently by not informing him that he 
could plead guilty to attempted possession with intent to 
distribute only if he knowingly and intentionally attempted to 
possess a controlled or counterfeit substance.8 The existing 
record does not support defendant's argument. 
In order to be guilty of attempted possession with intent to 
distribute, defendant had to intend to possess the counterfeit 
affidavit is not a part of the trial record. Additionally, 
because it represents defendant's self-serving and untested 
statements, defendant cannot rely on it to support his factual 
assertions. Therefore, the State asks that the Court order it 
stricken from defendant's brief. 
8Defendant faults counsel for failing to inform him of the 
elements of the crime to which he was pleading, but fails to 
identify the specific deficiency about which he complains. 
Appellant's Brief at 18. However, defendant challenged the 
validity of his guilty plea to attempted possession with intent 
to distribute because the plea affidavit and colloquy failed to 
inform him that he could only "knowingly and intentionally" 
attempt to possess the counterfeit methamphetamine. Appellant's 
Brief at 13. Presumably, this also defines the scope of his 
challenge to counsel's performance. If defendant intended a 
different argument, the brief gives no hint of what it might be; 
therefore, defendant has not preserved any other challenge to 
trial counsel's performance in informing him about the nature and 
elements of the crime. Qs& Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. 
Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984)(refusing to consider a 
issue that Amicone supported with no legal authority or 
analysis). 
Furthermore, this argument refers only to defendant's guilty 
plea to attempted possession and has no effect on his guilty plea 
to distribution of a counterfeit substance. 
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methamphetamine; that is, he had to have the ''conscious objective 
or desire" to possess it. See State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 843 
(Utah 1992) (a person cannot be guilty of an attempted crime 
without the conscious objective or desire to commit the crime). 
The record fails to support even defendant's broad assertion that 
trial counsel failed to inform him of the requisite mental state; 
it is just as likely that counsel fully explained to defendant 
that he could not plead to attempted possession unless he 
actually intended to posses the counterfeit methamphetamine.9 
Moreover, this record contains no facts to overcome the 
presumption that trial counsel represented defendant competently. 
£&£, erg»/ Parsons v, Barnes, 871 p.2d at 522. specifically, 
nothing in this record suggests that defendant contested that he 
did not intentionally attempt to possess the counterfeit 
methamphetamine or that his discussions with trial counsel 
provided her with information suggesting that he claimed he only 
unknowingly or involuntarily possessed the counterfeit substance. 
£££ Strickland. 466 U.S. at 691 ("what investigation decisions 
are reasonable depends critically on [information supplied by the 
Admittedly, the trial court did not include ^intentional" 
in its plea colloquy, and * intentional'' did not appear in the 
plea affidavit (R. 105, 137-38). Nevertheless, the record 
contains no evidence about what counsel explained to defendant. 
13 
defendant]")- To the contrary, the record supports concluding 
that defendant intentionally possessed the substance with the 
intent to distribute it: at the hearing on his motion to withdraw 
his pleas, defendant admitted selling the substance, asserting 
only that he had never represented it to be methamphetamine (R. 
144-45). 
Defendant next complains that counsel failed to ensure that 
the plea he signed was correctly stated.10 The argument fails to 
recognize that an attempt to commit a crime necessarily 
incorporates intent as the requisite mental state. State v. 
Vigil. 842 P.2d at 84 8. Counsel may have considered the 
statement of the elements adequate in light of this requirement. 
As noted above, counsel may also have informed defendant of this 
requirement even though it was not separately stated in the plea 
affidavit and plea colloquy. Without a record exploring why 
counsel did not challenge the absence of "intent" as a separately 
stated element, defendant has not established that counsel 
performed deficiently. 
Defendant also claims counsel should have argued the absence 
10Again, the argument presumably refers to the absence of a 
separately stated intent element in the attempted possession plea 
and affects only defendant's plea to that crime. 
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of a separately stated intent element in support of his motion to 
withdraw his pleas. For the reasons argued above, the record 
contains no facts to establish that defendant contested this 
issue. Moreover, making the argument could not have changed the 
outcome because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
motion in the first place. State v. Price. 837 P.2d at 581-82 
(Utah App. 1992). Counsel does not perform deficiently by 
failing or refusing to make futile motions. See State v. 
Malmrose, 649 p.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah 1982), overruled on other 
grounds. State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant next contends his counsel performed deficiently by 
filing his motions to withdraw his pleas two days after the 
jurisdictional deadline, and asserts without record support that 
he "timely" asked trial counsel to file the motions. Appellant's 
Brief at 18. Contrary to defendant's unsupported assertion, 
nothing in this record establishes when defendant requested 
counsel to file the motions. If he waited until 4:55 p.m. on the 
last day to file, he cannot lay the blame at counsel's door for 
the late filing. Defendant's vague and unsupported assertion 
that he timely requested filing the motions fails to establish 
deficient performance. 
Defendant also claims counsel erroneously failed to inform 
15 
him that he could withdraw his plea only upon a showing of good 
cause. Again, defendant cites no record support for this 
assertion, and the record contains none. Moreover, even if 
counsel did not personally inform defendant of the good cause 
requirement, the trial court did before accepting defendant's 
pleas, and defendant understood that he had no "guarantee" that 
he could withdraw his pleas (R. 139, 166). Therefore, defendant 
entered his guilty pleas with full knowledge of the good cause 
requirement, and any omission by counsel cannot have affected 
defendant's decision to plead guilty. This claim of 
ineffectiveness fails on the existing record. 
Defendant next claims counsel erroneously advised him to 
plead guilty because no witnesses would testify on his behalf. 
Again, the record contains no support for this factual assertion. 
Moreover, even if counsel had given this advice, the record 
contains no facts that rebut the presumption trial counsel 
rendered effective assistance. The record does not specify any 
witnesses defendant identified for counsel or what he told her 
about them. Any information defendant may have given to counsel 
may have led her to conclude that she could not locate any 
witnesses, that they would not testify, that they could not give 
credible testimony, or that they had nothing to offer as a 
16 
defense for defendant. See Strickland. 466 U.S. at 691 ("what 
investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on 
[information supplied by the defendant]"). 
Finally, defendant claims that trial counsel had a conflict 
of interest at the time of the hearing on his motion to withdraw 
his pleas. In order to established that he was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to conflict-free counsel, defendant must show 
that his trial counsel "actively represented conflicting 
interests'' and that wan actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer's performance." Gardener v. Holden. 888 P.2d 
608, 620 (Utah 1994) (quoting Strickland v, Washington, 466 u.s. 
at 692 (1984)), cert, denied. 116 S. Ct. 97 (1995). 
To support this claim, defendant asserts only that, because 
trial counsel had represented him "ineffectively" prior to the 
hearing on his motion to withdraw, she had a conflict at the 
hearing generated by a natural reluctance to admit her prior 
deficiencies. Defendant cites no authority to support his claim 
that this constitutes a conflict of interest sufficient to 
deprive him of his right to conflict-free counsel; therefore, the 
Court need not reach the merits of this claim. State v, Amicone. 
689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). Alternatively, the argument 
fails because it rests entirely on defendant's other claims of 
17 
ineffectiveness that the existing record either contradicts or is 
insufficient to allow this Court to review them on direct appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, the State requests that the 
Court affirm defendant's convictions. 
Oral Argument Requested 
The State requests oral argument in this case. Primarily, 
the State requests oral argument to address any questions the 
Court may have about the issues raised in the briefs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21 & day of Q&. 




<£(h~^ THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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(7) Each local authority shall pay for providing, training, and supervising 
school crossing guards in accordance with this section. 
History: C. 1658,41-6-20.1, enacted by L. CXaXii) si Subsections (2Xa) and (2Xb); de-
1662, eh. 61,1 S; 1664, eh. 66,1 1; 1664, eh. leted former Suheeetion (2Xb), the eubetanee of 
160,1 63. which was incorporated into Suheeetion (2Xa) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1694 amend- by the addition of "after written aafurance by a 
ment by eh. 66, effective May 2,1664, deleted local authority that the local authority will 
•Before January 1,1993" from the beginning of comply with Subsections (3) and (4)*; redeeig* 
Suheeetion (2); deleted former Suheeetion nated the subsections in Suheeetion (8) and 
(2Xb), adding comparable language to the end deleted former Suheeetion (8Kb), which read 
of Suheeetion (2Xt>, deleted former Suheeetion "Notwithstanding Suheeetion (aXiiXB) the de-
(3Xb), which provided for the maintenance of partment ahall provide for the maintenance of 
reduced epeed achool sones for etate highways reduced speed school aones for state highways 
as required under Section 41-6-21; added a as required under Section 41-6-21"; substituted 
proviso at the end of Suheeetion (SXbXii); added •Department of Transportation* tor "Xranspor-
Suheeetion (3Xc>, and made related changes. tation Commission11 in Subsection (6); and 
The 1994 amendment by eh. 120, effective made stylistic changes. 
May 2, 1994, deleted "(a) Before January 1, This section is set out as reconciled by the 
1993" at the beginning of Subsection (2); ndm- Office of Legislative Research and General 
ignated former Subsections (2XaXi) and Counsel. 
ARTICLE 4 
ACCIDENTS 
41-6-29. Operator9! duty at accident — Stop at accident — 
Penalty. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Corpus delicti. the scene was in fact the driver of the vehicle 
In order for the state to establish corpus and not merely a passenger. State v. Hansen, 
delicti, the state must establish by clear and 657 R2d 678 (Utah Ct App. 1993). 
convincing evidence that the person who left 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concen-
tration — Measurement of blood or breath alco-
hol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without 
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revoca-
tion of license — Penalties. 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this etate if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
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(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (1) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor, or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, or 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circum-
stances. 
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes any similar local 
ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work 
in a community-service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more 
than 50 hours. 
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the court may 
order the person to obtain treatment at an sJcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem 
condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation cozzunitted within six years 
of a prior violation under this section the court shall as part of any 
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecu-
tive hours nor more than 720 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work 
in a community-service work program for not less than 80 hours nor more 
than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall order the person to participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility. 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two 
prior violations under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and 
(7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for 
violations committed after April 23,1990. 
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(b) (i) Under Subsection (aXi) the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 
2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(c) (i) Under Subsection (aXii) the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail 
sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sen-
tencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the 
program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term 
closely supervised follow through after the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of the prior violations under this section is a third degree felony 
if at least three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 
23,1990. 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a fine of not less than 
$1,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 hours 
nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail 
sentence. 
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing 
alternative to incarceration or community service if the program 
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely 
supervised follow through after the treatment. 
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section 
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked 
as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person 
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education, 
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after 
July 1,1993, have been completed; 
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(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilita-
tion costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the conviction 
is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner 
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed 
after July 1,1993. 
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the 
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation facility; or do any combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as 
a prior conviction under Subsection (10). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or 
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
tinder Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior conviction under 
Subsection (10), as the court would render in connection with applying 
respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements 
of Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section 
41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a first, 
second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous convic-
tion under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior 
conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any 
community-based or other education program provided for in this section 
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services. 
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to 
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted 
under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an 
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall 
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or 
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 41-6-45 as follows. 
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest 
to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for 
the record that there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combi-
nation of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation, the 
resulting conviction is a prior conviction for the purposes of Subsec-
tions (5), (6), and (7). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41*6-45 that is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and 
(7). 
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(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first time under Subsection (1); and 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed 
within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation. 
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation 
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended 
under Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was based cm the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
History: L. 1941, eh. 52, I 84; C. 1843, Amendment Notea. — The 1994 amend-
87-7-111; L. 1949, eh. 86,1 1; 1957, eh. 75, merit by cfa. 169, affective March 17, 1994, 
I 1; 1967, ch. 98, f 2; 1969, ch. 107,1 2; 1977, added Subsection (3XaXiiXB), making related 
eh. 968, | S; 1979, eh. S4S, I 1; 1981, eh. 63, chanfet, and euhatituted ^ Section 53-3-223" for 
I S; 1982, eh* 46, i 1; 1983, ch- 99,1 18; 19SS, "41-2-130" in Suheection (12 Xb). 
eh, 108,1 1; 1983, ch, 183,1 S3; 1985, eh. 46, The 1994 amendment by ch. 263, effective 
I 1; 19S6, eh. 122,1 1; 1986, eh. 178, | 29; May 2, 1994, eubdivided Subjection (12Xa), 
1987, eh. 1S8,1 87; 1987 (1st 8£.), eh. 8,1 2; substituted "63-3-223" for ^ l-MSO" in Subeec-
1988, eh, 17,1 1; 1990, eh, 183, I 16; 1990, tion (12Xb), and made stylistic changes. 
eh, 299,1 1; 1991, eh. 147,1 1; 1993, eh. 168, This aection it aet out as reconciled by the 
I 1; 1993, eh. 193, f 1; 1998, eh. 284,1 82; Office of Legislative Research and General 
1994, eh. 159,1 1; 1994, eh, 263,1 1. Counsel. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Searches. tion of blood alcohol and the possible loss or 
In a prosecution for driving under the influ- corruption of that evidence, justified a warrant-
ence of alcohol, exigent circumstances, includ- leas search of defendant's home. City of Oram v. 
fog the concern of the police about the diaaipa- Henrie, 868 R2d 1884 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
41-6-44.3, Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evi-
dence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Failure to oomply with standards. tion and validity of the avidenoe may not be 
Failure to oomply fully with standards aatab- presumed, but rather that they will have to be 
Kshed by the Department of Public Safety does established in order for the avidenoe to be 
not necessarily make breath test avidenoe in- admitted. Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 
admissible. It simply means that the founds- 443 (Utah Ct App. 1993). 
41-6-44.6. Definitions — Driving with any measurable 
controlled substance in the body — Penalties — 
Arrest without warrant. 
(1) As used in this taction: 
(a) "Controlled substance* means any substance scheduled under See-
tion 58-37-4. 
(b) "Practitioner*has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2. 
(c) "Prescribe* has the same meaning as provided in Section 68-37-2. 
(d) "Prescription" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2. 
UNIFORM DRIVER LICENSE ACT 63-3-227 
53-3-227. Driving a motor vehicle prohibited while license 
denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked — 
Penalties. 
(1) A person whose license has been denied, suspended, disqualified, or 
revoked under this chapter or under the laws of the state in which his license 
was issued and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state 
while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be pun-
ished as provided in this section. 
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other than a violation 
specified in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose conviction under 
Subsection (1) is based on his driving a motor vehicle while his license is 
suspended, disqualified, or revoked for 
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test under Section 41-6-44.10; 
(ii) a violation of Section 41-6-44; 
(iii) a violation of a local ordinance that complies with the require-
ments of Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) a violation of Section 76-5-207; 
(v) a criminal action that the person plead guilty to as a result of a 
plea bargain after having been originally charged with violating one 
or more of the sections or ordinances under this subsection; 
(vi) a revocation or suspension which has been extended under 
Subsection 53-3-220(2); or 
(vii) where disqualification is the result of driving a commercial 
motor vehicle while the person's CDL is disqualified, suspended, can-
celed, or revoked under Subsection 53-3-414(1). 
(b) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose conviction under 
Subsection (1) is based upon his driving a motor vehicle while his license 
is suspended, disqualified, or revoked in his state of licensure for viola-
tions corresponding to the violations listed in Subsection (a). 
(c) A fine imposed under this subsection shall be at least the maximum 
fine for a class C misdemeanor under Section 76-3-301. 
History: L. 1*33, ch. 45, t 29; C. 1*43, 
*7-4-32; L. 1*83, ch. 99, f 8; 1*83, ch. 183, 
I 27; C. 1*53, 41-2-28; renumbered by L. 
1*87, c h 137, f 36; 1*88, ch. 209, f 20; 1*68, 
Ch. 252, > 7; 1990, ch. 30, f 8; 1*91, ch. 241, 
I 60; 1992, ch. 60,1 3; C. 1953, 41-2-136; re-
numbered by L. 1993, ch. 234, f 106. 
Amendment Note*. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23,1990, inaerted 'Viola-
tion of a" before local" in Subaection (SKaXiii); 
aubetitutad "action" for "prohibition'' and in-
aerted "to" altar "guilty" in Subaection 
(SXaXv); aubatituted "a revocation or suepen-
aion which*' for "wboee revocation or suspen-
sion" at the beginning of Subaection (3XaXvi); 
and added Subaection (SXaXvii). 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
1991, aubatituted "claae C" for "claw B" in Sub-
eectionf (2) and (8Kb) and aubetitutad "claae B" 
for "daae A" in Subaection (3Xa). 
Tbe 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, aubatituted "or under the iawi of the 
etate in which hie licenae wae iaeued and who 
operate*" for "and operate*" in Subaection (1), 
aubatituted "that" for "which" in Subaection 
(SKaXiii), added present Subaection (3Xb), re-
designated former Subaection (3Xb) aa present 
Subaection (3XO, and aubatituted "at least" for 
"in an amount not leas than" in Subaection 
(8X0. 
Ihe 1993 amendment, effective July 1,1993, 
renumbered thie section, which formerly ap-
peared aa f 41-2-136, aubetitutad "drive" for 
"operate" throughout, added "motor" in Sub-
eectiona (SXa) and (b), and updated the section 
citations to reflect the creation of Title 53. 
Croee-Refereneea, — Sentencing for miade-
meanora, If 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
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(10) Any person who obtains or attempts to obtain information from the 
database by misrepresentation or fraud ia guilty of a third degree felony. 
(11) (a) A person may not knowingly and intentionally use, release, publish, 
or otherwise make available to any other person or entity any information 
obtained from the database for any purpose other than those specified in 
Subsection (8). Each separate violation of this subsection is a third degree 
felony and is also subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000. 
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of this subsection 
shall be in accordance with Section 68-1*108, regarding adjudicative 
proceedings within the division. 
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall be deposited in 
the General Fund 
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit information to the 
database as required under this section after the division has submitted a 
specific written request for the information or when the division deter-
mines the individual has a demonstrable pattern of foiling to submit the 
information as required is grounds for the division to take the following 
actions in accordance with Section 58-1-401: 
(i) refuse to iaaue a license to the individual; 
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license; 
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation the license; 
(iv) iaaue a public or private reprimand to the individual; 
(v) iaaue a cease and desist order, and 
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each 
dispensed prescription regarding which the required information is 
not submitted. 
(b) Civil penalties aaaeaaed under Subsection (aXvi) ahall be deposited 
in the General Fund. 
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of thia aubaection 
ahall be in accordance with Section 58-1*108, regarding adjudicative 
proceedings within the division, 
(IS) An individual who has submitted information to the database in 
accordance with this section may not be held civilly liable for having submitted 
the information. 
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to establish and 
operate the database shall be funded by appropriations from the General 
Fund. 
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated without the use of any 
resources within the Commerce Service Fund. 
(15) All coata aaaociated with recording and submitting data aa required in 
this aection ahall be assumed by the submitting drug outlet 
History: C. 1*53,SS*7.7J, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Uws 1W6, eL 833,14 
lSS5,eh.SSM S. inakesths set effective sa July 1,1*9*. 
58-37-8. Prohibited acta — Penalties-
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
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(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (lXa) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorised by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where 
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this 
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted 
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the 
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; 
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a Juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child* as defined in Section 
78-Sa-2, and "emergency9 means any physical condition requiring the 
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain 
cor suffering; 
INCHOATE OFFENSES 76-4-101 
Section 
76-4-302. Conviction of inchoate and princi-
pal offense or attempt and con-




76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
History: C. 1953, 76*4-101, enacted by L. 
197S, ch. 196,1 76-4-101. 






Attempt to receive stolen property. 
Campaign contributions. 








Preclusion of the defense of impossibility by 
toil section does not violate the due process 
clsuse of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. 
Sommen, 669 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977). 
Attempted burglary. 
—Enhanced sentence. 
Congress did not intend implicitly to include 
attempted burglary as a violent offense when it 
specified burglary as a violent felony under 18 
U.S.C. | 924(eX2XBXii), providing for en-
hanced sentences in certain circumstances. 
United States v. Strahl, 956 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
A conviction under H 76-4-101 and 76-6-202 
for attempted burglary is not s conviction for an 
offense which 'otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another" under 18 U.S.C. 
{ 924(eX2XBXii)l providing for enhanced sen-
tences, since attempted burglary convictions, 
under Utah law, may include conduct well 
outside Congress's target of "violent" felonies. 
United States v. Strahl, 958 F£d 980 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
Attempted murder. 
The crime of attempted murder requires 
proof of intent to kill. Attempted murder does 
not fit within the felony-murder doctrine be-
cause an attempt to commit a crime requires 
proof of an intent to consummate the crime. 
Therefore, it follows that attempted felony-
murder does not exist as s crime in Utah. State 
•. Bell, 785 R2d 390 (Utah 1989). 
In order to convict defendant of attempted 
first degree murder, the state had the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the follow-
ing: (i) she had the intent to kill or knowledge 
that her acts would result in death if carried 
out; (ii) the engaged in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward causing the death of 
her husband; and (iii) she did so either (a) by 
administering or attempting to administer a 
poison or lethal substance or a substance ad-
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALTBB tion OD appeal of the purportedly preserved 
_ . , issue would not have naeaasanly ended the 
Conditional plea. nroeecution of the case. State v. Montoya, 868 
OM
' R2d 1027 (Utah Ct App. 1993). 
Conditional plea. Cfced in SUte •. Serr. 768 R2d 935 (Utah Ct 
lhal court ahould not have accepted a condi- AZ?7S*8I ^^ 
tknal no contaat plea aince a fitvorabk reeolu- ***?' J*50'* 
77-13-4. Felonies — Entry in open court. 
All pleas in felony eases shall be entered by the defendant in open eourt and 
the proceedings recorded. 
History: C. 1958, 77-18-4, enacted by L. 
1980, en, 15,1 2. 
77-13-5. Failure to plead — Not guilty entered. 
When a defendant does not enter a plea, the court ahall enter a plea of not 
guilty for him. 
History: C. 1958, 77-18-5, enacted by L. 
1960, eh. 15,1 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Wairer. going to trial. State v. Eitei, 62 Utah 572,176 
One accused of crime could waive mere for- P. 271 (1918). 
nudity of entering plea of not guilty before 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jxut. 2d. — 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal CJJL — 22 C JB. Criminal Law | 878. 
Law f 447. Key Numbers, —- Criminal Law «• 266. 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
History: C. 1958, 77*184, enacted by I* Amendment Notes, — The 1994 amend-
1980, eh, 15, | 2; 1989, en, 66, f 1; 1994, eh- ment, effective May 2,1994, substituted "Rule 
II, I 1. 65B" for «Rult 65R(ir in Subsection (8). 
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7S-2-2. Bujumtt Ooort jurisdiction. 
78-2*2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to cany into efifect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(S) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in fonwd ac^dicative proce^ings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer, or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources 
reviewing actions of the Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subeerrtt (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional cm its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees 
ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3) (a) through (d). 
78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 6 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3) (b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C IMS, 7 * 4 4 , enacted by L. 
1986, ch, 47,1 41; 19S7, ch- 161,1 803; 1988, 
eh, S4S, I 6; 1989, ch- 67,1 1; 199% ch, 197, 
I 11; 1994, ch, 191,1 t; 1995, ch- 967,1 8; 
1995, ch- 999,1 46. 
Amendznant Note*. — Tha 1992 amend-
toent, affective April 27,1992, is Subsection (4), 
deleted fin-mar Subsections (e) and (f), which 
read; "general water adjudication* and •taxa-
tion and revenue; and," respective]?, making 
related change*; redesignated former Subsec-
tion (g) ai Subeection (e); and made stylistic 
changes in Subeection (e). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
added Subsections (SXk) and (4Xe), making 
related changes. 
The 1995 amendments by ch. 267 and ch. 
299, both effective May 1,1995, made the same 
changes: they changed 'Board of State Lands 
and Forestry" to 'School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Board of Trustees" in Subeection 
(BXeXiii) and added Subeection (BXaXvi). 











Although this section did not govern a land 
conveyance because it was not in effect when 
petitioner filed its writ of review, this section 
did not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdic-
tion, because jurisdiction attached under the 
statute in effect when the petition for review 
was filed. National Parks A Conservation Aas'n 
% Board of State Lands, 969 R2d 909 (Utah 
1993). 
—FonnaJ adjudicative pmneortrnge. 
Subdivision (SXeXiii) confers jurisdiction m 
the Supreme Court only over final orders and 
decrees that originate in formal adjudicative 
proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 630 R2d 233 (Utah 1992). 
Certiorari 
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction 
granted by this section, the 8upreme Court 
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
not of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the 
parties should address the decision of the Court 
of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 631 R2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
Originjd jurisdiction, 
—Extraordinary write. 
Ike term •original" in Subsection (2) adds 
nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdic-
tion — and its absence in I 76»2a-3(l) takes 
siothing from the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals — because jurisdiction © w petitions 
for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a 
court's jurisdiction to consider a petition origi-
nally filed with it aa opposed to its appellate 
jurisdiction over eases that originated else-
where. Barnard v. Murphy, 682 E2d 679 (Utah 
CtApp.1994). 
Cited in Bute v. Humphrey, 823 R2d 464 
(Utah 1991). 
CHAPTER 2a 
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7S-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a*3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue ai] extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
Rule 2SA UTAH BULBS OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 432 
(2) Motions and other papere ahall be typewritten on opaque, unglazed 
paper 8Vi by 11 inches in size. Paper may be recycled paper, with or 
without deinking. The text ahall be in type not smaller than ten charac-
ters per inch. Lines of text ahall be double spaced and ahall be upon one 
aide of the paper only. Consecutive sheets ahall be attached at the upper 
left margin. 
(S) A motion or other paper ahall contain a caption setting forth the 
name of the court, the title of the case, the docket number, and a brief 
descriptive title indicating the purpose of the paper. The attorney ahall 
sign ail papers filed with the court with his or her individual name. The 
attorney ahall give his or her business address, telephone number, and 
Utah State Bar number in the upper left hand corner of the first page of 
every paper filed with the court except briefs. A party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign any paper filed with the court and state 
the party's address and telephone number. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 emend- The 1994 amendment, in Subdivision (f), 
ment, effective October 1,1992, sdded the Sub- substituted the eeoond through fifth eentenoei 
division (b) designation snd heading end sdded in Subdivision (1) for the former first eentence, 
Subdivision (c), redesignating the following which had required an original and five oopiee 
subdivisions accordingly end making a related in the Supreme Court and an original end four 
change in the Subdivision (s) heading, and oopiee in the Court of Appeals and had autho-
added "or reply" to the end of the first sentence rised the court to require additional copiei, end 
in Subdivision (d). added the eeoond eentence in Subdivision (2). 
Rule 23A. Motion for reinstatement of appeal. 
An appeal dismissed for failure to take a step other than the timely filing of 
a notice of appeal may be reinstated by the court upon motion of the appellant 
for (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or (b) fraud, mis-
representation, or misconduct of an adverse party. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time after entry of the order of dismissal. 
(Added effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 23B. Motion to remand for determination of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case 
may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for the purpose of 
entering findings of fact relevant to a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. The motion shall be available only upon an allegation of facts constituting 
ineffective assistance of counsel not fully appearing in the record on appeal. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the 
filing of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be 
filed after oral argument Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from 
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim 
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23, The motion shall include or be accom-
panied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal 
that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits 
shall also allege facta that ahow the claimed prejudice suffered by the appel-
lant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. A response shall be filed 
within 20 days after the motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed within 10 
days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court Upon consideration of the motion, affidavits, and 
memoranda, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to 
the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact relevant to the dais 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. If it appears to the appellate court that the 
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attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the 
court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appel-
lant be appointed or retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal Oral argument and the deadlines fin* briefs shall be 
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other proce-
dural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, 
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties 
or upon the court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court Upon remand the trial court shall 
conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of fact 
necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Eviden-
tiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable 
after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the 
fact The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial 
court shall enter written findings of fact. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings as required 
by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court 
has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court shall 
immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon prepa-
ration of the supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings 
before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk 
of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon 
the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the 
trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule 
for briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been 
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. 
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the 
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
(Added effective October 1, 1992.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Allegation of facte required. to remind a claim under this rait for a fishing 
Becauae defendant did not allege any frcta in expedition. State r. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578 
support of hie ineffeetire aatiftance claim, the (Utah Ct Asp.), cert denied, 060 P. 948 (Utah 
appellate court would not remand the caae for 1993). 
an evidentiary hearing. It would be improper 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or 
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where 
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. 
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately 
inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with 
page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in 
the trial court; or 
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Amendment Noiaa. — Tbe 1995 amend- man (bX3), relating to a request for an enlarge-
ment deleted a eecond eentence from Subdivi- awnt of time greater than six days. 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant ahall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or 
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where 
the caption of tbe case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. 
The list should be aet out on a eeparate page which appears immediately 
inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with 
page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
<4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in 
the trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for eofking review of an issue not pre-
served in the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regula-
tions whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate 
citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation 
alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to 
the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. A statement of the facta relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements offset and references to the proceed-
ings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of tbe brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the 
heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and rea-
sons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum ia 
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum ahall be bound as part of 
the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the ad-
dendum is bound separately, the addendum ahall contain a table of con-
tents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of cen-
tral importance cited in tike brief but not reproduced verbatim in the 
brief; 
(B) in eases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of 
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance 
to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly 
published reporter service; and 
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(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central impor-
tance to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged 
instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum 
decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or 
document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissat-
isfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the adden-
dum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the 
appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief 
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the require-
ments of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may 
be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their 
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a mininuiTn references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the 
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee,9* "the 
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of 
any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits shall be made to the 
exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is 
in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the 
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs 
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive 
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any adden-
dum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as re-
quired by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, para-
graph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in 
length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of 
the appellant and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall 
then file a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the 
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues 
raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not 
exceed 25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second 
brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the 
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appel-
lant's first brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of 
contents, table of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by 
permission of the court The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good 
cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated 
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for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of 
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An origi-
nal letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
0') Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be con-
cise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offend-
ing lawyer. 
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995.) 
Amendment Notes. — Tbe 1995 amend- virion (g), added the 50-page limit, eubetituted 
ment added the provision for cases reviewed on "apeUeeJeroaft-appeliant" for "appellee" in the 
certiorari in Subdivirion (aXll); added the tec- third sentence, and all the language beginning 
end sentence in Subdivision (f); and, in Subdi- with the fourth sentence. 
Rule 26. Filing and service of briefs. 
(a) Time for service and filing briefs. The appellant shall serve and file a 
brief within 40 days after date of notice from the clerk of the appellate court 
pursuant to Rule 13, unless a motion for summary disposition of the appeal or 
a motion to remand for determination of ineffective assistance of counsel has 
been previously interposed, in which event service and filing shall be within 
30 days from the denial of such motion. The appellee, or in cases involving a 
cross-appeal, the appellee/cross-appellant, shall serve and file a brief within 
SO days after service of the appellant's brief In cases involving cross-appeals, 
the appellant shall serve and file the second brief described in Rule 24(g) 
within SO days after eervice of the appellee/cross-appellant's brief. A reply 
brief may be served and filed by the appellant or the appellee/cross-appellant 
in cases involving cross-appeals. If a reply brief is filed, it shall be served and 
filed within SO days after the filing and service of the appellee's brief or the 
appellant's second brief in cases involving cross-appeals. If oral argument is 
scheduled fewer than 35 days after the filing of appellee's brief, the reply brief 
must be filed at least 5 days prior to oral argument. By stipulation filed with 
the court, the parties may extend each of such periods for no more than 30 
days in civil cases or 15 days in criminal cases. A motion for enlargement of 
time need not accompany the stipulation. No such stipulation shall be effec-
tive unless it is filed prior to the expiration of the period sought to be ex-
tended. 
(b) Number of copies to be filed and served. For matters pending in the 
Supreme Court, ten copies of each brief, one of which shall contain an original 
signature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. For matters 
pending in the Court of Appeals, eight copies of each brief, one of which shall 
contain an original signature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals. Two copies shall be served on counsel for each party separately 
represented. 
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Case No. 940624-CA 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Joe Rakes, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Dear Ms. Jensen: 
Please be advised that the notice of appeal in this case has 
been filed with the Court of Appeals. The case number is 940624-CA 
and should be indicated on any future filings. 
If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within 
the same period the appellant must file a certificate to that effect 
with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken and a 
copy with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. 
The request for transcript was made October 11, 1994. R.12(a) 
allows the court reporter, Kathleen Schultz, 30 days to prepare the 
transcript. As the appellant's counsel, and party requesting the 
transcript, it is your responsibility to ensure the timely filing of 
the transcript. 
The Docketing Statement and attachments, consisting of the 
original and three copies, is due within 21 days of the filing of 
the notice of appeal in the trial court. Therefore, the docketing 
statement is due November 1, 1994. 
Please note, failure to perfect an appeal at any time during 
the appeal process nay result in dismissal of the appeal. 
Sincerely, 
/Janice Hill 
* - Deputy Clerk 
cc: yJan Graham - Criminal Appeals Division 
Kathleen Schultz 
Third District, Salt Lake County #941900597 
OCT 19 W • miu uuaiciai uisinct 
JUDITH A. JENSEN, #4603 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
|«T OF APPEALS OCT n 894 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 941900597 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that JOE RAKES, Defendant/Appellant 
in the above-entitled action, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of 
Appeals from the final judgment and conviction rendered against him 
on the 19th day of September, 1994, by the Honorable John A. Rokich, 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
DATED this tHA day of October, 1994. 
<CM. tf&y 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT 
DISTRICT COURT. SALT 
UTAH. 
DEPUTY COURT 
JUDITH A . JENSEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JUDITH A. JENSEN, hereby certify that I have caused to 
be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; KATHY 
SCHULTZ, Court Reporter, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and the Utah 
Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, this ll+L day of October, 1994. 
JUDITH A. JENSEN/' 
DELIVERED this \\ day of October, 1994. 
